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DEBT COLLECTION SERVICES OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
ARE GOVERNED BY ILLINOIS
COLLECTION AGENCY AND
DECEPTIVE PRACTICES ACTS
In People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems
Corp., 176 III. App. 3d 697, 531 N.E.2d 839 (1st
Dist. 1988), the Illinois Appellate Court held that
debt collection services provided by independent contractors are governed by the Illinois
Collection Agency Act (llI.Rev.Stat. ch. 111, pars.
2001-2040 (1987)), the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (IIl.Rev.Stat. ch.
121 1/2, pars. 261-272 (1987)), and the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (IllI.Rev.Stat. ch.
121 1/2, pars. 311-317 (1987)). In addition, the
court held that the State's complaint sufficiently
questioned whether home rule municipal powers extend to independent contractors.
Background
In 1985, the City of Chicago ("the City") contracted with Datacom Systems Corporation
("Datacom") to collect allegedly outstanding
parking fines. Datacom received a debt collection license from the Illinois Department of Registration and Education ("the DRE"). The contract designated Datacom an independent
contractor and not an agent of the City. Pursuant
to the contract, Datacom mailed notices to
delinquent ticket holders, collected the fines,
and retained between 20% and 42% of the
monies collected. The notices instructed the
recipients to pay the "total amount due," which
included an amount designated "fines and penalties" plus an additional amount for "court
costs" and "mailing fees." The "fines and penalties," however, were greater than the original
fines. In addition, the original fines had not
included "court costs" or "mailing fees." Neither
the City nor Datacom had obtained judicial approval to increase the parking fines, or to charge
the delinquent ticket holders for court costs or
mailing fees. Datacom deposited the checks,
made payable to the Cook County circuit court
clerk, directly into Datacom's bank account.
The Cook County State's Attorney ("the State")
brought an action on behalf of the people of the
State of Illinois against the City and Datacom
seeking declaratory and equitable relief, including fines against Datacom and revocation of
Datacom's license. The State alleged that Datacorn's actions violated the Illinois Collection

Agency Act ("the Collection Act"), the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("the Consumer Fraud Act"), and the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("the Deceptive
Practices Act"). The State also alleged that the
actions of the City and Datacom exceeded their
corporate authorities. The trial court held that
Datacom's actions were within its corporate
authority and not covered by any of the Acts.
Therefore, the trial court dismissed the State's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
At the same time that the State filed its complaint in the trial court, the DRE initiated administrative action to suspend or revoke Datacom's
collection license, alleging that Datacom violated the Collection Act. The trial court granted
Datacom leave to file a third-party complaint
against the DRE. In its complaint, Datacom
sought a declaratory judgment that its activities
were not governed by the Collection Act and an
injunction against further administrative proceedings by the DRE. The trial court granted
Datacom's request and thus enjoined the DRE
from taking administrative action against Datacom. The State and the DRE appealed.
Collection of Parking Fines is Governed by
Illinois Collection Agency Act
In the appellate court, the State again alleged
that Datacom's actions violated the Collection
Act. The Collection Act defines a collection
agency as a corporation which "[e]ngages
in... collection for others of any account, bill or
other indebtedness." III.Rev.Stat. ch. 111, par.
2006(a) (1987). Datacom claimed that because
the Act does not apply to "public officers," and
because Datacom acted at the direction of the
City, its actions were exempted from the Collection Act. The State argued that an independent
contractor may not benefit from the public
officer exception to the Act. The appellate court
held that because Datacom's contract with the
City designated it an independent contractor,
the trial court should not have dismissed the
State's complaint based on the public officer
exception. The appellate court remanded the
issues of whether Datacom was an agent of the
City or an independent contractor, and the legal
significance of its status, to the trial court.
Datacom also argued that the Collection Act
did not govern its actions because the parking
tickets were not "debts" within the meaning of
the Collection Act. In support of this argument,

Datacom cited cases which held that municipal
fines are not debts under Illinois law. Although
the Collection Act does not define "debts," the
Illinois Vehicle Code provides that a "parking
violation ... constitute[s] a debt due...the municipality." III.Rev.Stat. ch. 95 1/2, par. 11208.3(b)(5)(i) (1987)(emphasis added). Therefore,
the court reasoned, the legislature clearly intended the term "debts" in the Collection Act to
include parking ticket fines.
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act Governs Collection of Debts
Owed to City
The State also alleged that Datacom violated
the Consumer Fraud Act. The Consumer Fraud
Act defines "trade" and "commerce" to include
the "sale.. .of any services.. .directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State." III.Rev.
Stat. ch. 121 1/2, par. 261(f) (1987). Datacom
argued that although debt collection is generally "trade or commerce" under the Consumer
Fraud Act, mailing notices to delinquent parking
ticket holders was not a typical consumer transaction intended to be included in "trade or
commerce." The appellate court held that because the Consumer Fraud Act does not differentiate between consumer debts and other
types of debts, the only relevant inquiry was
whether the City had purchased any debt collection services. Because the debt collection services Datacom provided the City were similar to
the debt collection services provided to other
creditors, the court held that Datacom's activities were "trade or commerce" within the scope
of the Consumer Fraud Act.
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act Applies
to Misrepresentations Made to Recipients of
Debt Collection Notices
The State further alleged that Datacom's actions violated the Deceptive Practices Act. Datacom argued that the Deceptive Practices Act was
intended to grant relief to individuals for unfair
competition. Accordingly, recipients of Datacom's notices were not "person[s] likely to be'
damaged by a deceptive trade practice" of Datacom. lll.Rev.Stat. ch. 121 1/2, par. 313 (1987). In
support of this argument, Datacom relied upon
Chirikos v. Yellow Cab Co., 87 III. App. 3d 569,
410 N.E.2d 61 (1st Dist. 1980), and Steinberg v.
Chicago Medical School, 69 III. 2d 320, 371
N.E.2d 634 (1977).

In Chirikos, taxicab companies allegedly made
misrepresentations to the City in order to obtain
a fare increase. The Chirikos court held that
because the misrepresentations were not made
to taxicab riders, the plaintiff taxicab rider had
not stated a claim for relief and the trial court
had properly dismissed the complaint. Here,
however, the alleged misrepresentations were
included in Datacom's notice, and therefore
were made directly to the consumers.
In Steinberg, a medical school allegedly made
misrepresentations to prospective students, including the plaintiff, about its admissions policies. The Steinberg court held that the statements were not covered by the Deceptive
Practices Act because the plaintiff did not purchase educational services and thus could not
be a "consumer." The issue in Steinberg, however, was whether the plaintiff had standing to
sue as a "consumer," and not whether the cause
of action fell within the scope of the Deceptive
Practices Act. Here, the defendants did not dispute the State's standing to sue on behalf of the
people of Illinois.
Plaintiff Sufficiently Questioned Whether Home
Rule Municipal Powers Extend to Independent
Contractors
The State also brought a quo warranto ("by
what authority") action against the City and Datacom which alleged that the actions of the City
and Datacom exceeded their respective authority. In such actions, the defendant has the
burden of proving that it had the relevant legal
authority for its actions. The appellate court held
that the State's complaint sufficiently questioned
the extra-judicially increased fines, and Datacom's ability to deposit checks made payable to
the City in Datacom's bank account. The City
and Datacom argued that Datacom's actions
were ministerial exercises of the City's home
rule powers and therefore were proper. The
appellate court held that neither the City nor
Datacom had presented arguments sufficient to
warrant dismissal of the State's complaint. The
City had no authority to raise the parking ticket
fines because the municipal code empowered
only a judge to increase the fines. Moreover,
neither the City nor Datacom offered sufficient
legal authority for allowing Datacom to cash
checks made payable to the City.
(continued on page 110)
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In sum, the appellate court held that the trial
court erred in dismissing the State's action
against Datacom and in enjoining the DRE's
administrative action against Datacom. In addition, the trial court should have dismissed Data-

NON-SUPPLYING CIGARETTE
MANUFACTURERS, THEIR
TRADE ASSOCIATION, AND
PUBLIC RELATIONS GROUP
MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH UNDER A
THEORY OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY
In I.D. Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
761 S.W. 2d 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the Texas
Court of Appeals held that non-supplying cigarette manufacturers, their trade association
and their public relations organization were not
entitled to summary judgment in a case involving a smoker's death. The court held that substantial issues of material fact existed as to
whether plaintiffs' decedent wife and mother
would have quit smoking if she had known of
the dangers of smoking, and as to whether
defendants were liable on the theory of civil
conspiracy.
Background
From sometime in the early fifties until 1982,
decedent, Marjorie Rogers, regularly smoked
one pack of cigarettes or more per day. In the
early sixties, as media publicity of the dangers of
smoking increased, Mrs. Rogers began to realize
that she should cut down on her smoking or try
to quit. Apparently, Mrs. Rogers took comfort in
the fact that cigarette warnings stated that smoking may be hazardous to one's health as opposed to stating that smoking is hazardous to
one's health. Mrs. Rogers quit smoking in November of 1982 after being diagnosed as having
lung cancer. She died of the disease on December 17, 1983.
Mrs. Roger's surviving husband and children
brought a products liability suit against six major
American tobacco industries ("the Big-6"), their
trade association, the Tobacco Institute, Inc.
("the TI"), and their research and public relations organization, the Council for Tobacco

com's third-party complaint seeking declaratory
relief against the DRE. The appellate court
remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
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Research-U.S.A., Inc. ("the CTR"). In the mid1950s, five of the Big-6 industries (the sixth subsequently joined) took the position that smoking cigarettes did not cause lung cancer. Shortly
thereafter, the Big-6 formed what was originally
known as the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, now known as the CTR, for the purposes
of researching the relationship between tobacco
smoking and health and providing factual information on smoking to the public. In 1958, the
Big-6 formed the TI for the purpose of collecting
and disseminating scientific and medical material relating to tobacco, its use, and health.
The Rogers brought this suit alleging that the
defendants had entered into a civil conspiracy
or concert of action with a twofold purpose: (1)
to conceal and suppress scientific and medical
information regarding tobacco use and health;
and (2) to establish a vehicle by which the Big-6
were able to take a strong and pervasive stance
that smoking-caused disease had not been
proven. The Rogers' claims were based on
alleged cigarette design and marketing defects,
misrepresentations, negligence and fraud.
In the trial court, the Rogers' attempted to
establish that the Big-6, the TI and the CTR had
acted to suppress information which would
have made the dangers of smoking apparent to
Mrs. Rogers. They offered the affidavit of Dr.
Richard I. Evans, a prominent social psychologist, in which he stated that, in his opinion, Mrs.
Rogers would have stopped smoking in 1965 if
she had fully understood the dangers of smoking at the time. Appellees moved for summary
judgment pursuant to a Texas statute. Tex. R. Civ.
P.Ann. r. 166a(c) (Vernon 1976). The statute provides for summary judgment as a matter of law
when the court determines that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. The trial
court granted the motion based on its findings
that the Rogers raised no genuine issues of fact
under their various theories.

